Ex post adaptations and hybrid contracts in software development services by Fink, L. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Fink, L., Lichtenstein, Y. & Wyss, S. (2013). Ex post adaptations and hybrid 
contracts in software development services. Applied Economics, 45(32), pp. 4533-4544. doi: 
10.1080/00036846.2013.791021 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/18016/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2013.791021
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
This article was downloaded by: [T&F Internal Users], [Carol Alexander]
On: 24 June 2013, At: 10:25
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Applied Economics
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raec20
Ex post adaptations and hybrid contracts in software
development services
Lior Finka, Yossi Lichtensteinb & Simon Wyssc
a Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Ben-Gurion University of the
Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel
b Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia, London, UK
c Smurfit Graduate Business School, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
To cite this article: Lior Fink, Yossi Lichtenstein & Simon Wyss (2013): Ex post adaptations and hybrid contracts in software
development services, Applied Economics, 45:32, 4497-4508
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2013.791021
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to
anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should
be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims,
proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in
connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Ex post adaptations and hybrid
contracts in software development
services
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We follow the recent literature on ex post adaptations in procurement and argue
that highly volatile speciﬁcations result in multiple variations of ﬁxed price (FP)
and time and materials (T&M) contracts. Speciﬁcally, placing a cap on speciﬁca-
tion change in FP contracts prevents speciﬁcation volatility, similar to the way
that placing a cap on the price in T&M contracts prevents price escalation. We
argue that these hybrid mechanisms are particularly important in software devel-
opment contracting, a new critical business capability involving frequent and
costly ex post adaptations to speciﬁcation change. The level of completeness in
these contractual archetypes is hypothesized to be determined by contracting
costs and beneﬁts, where costs are related to project uncertainty and beneﬁts are
related to the likelihood of vendor opportunism. We test this hypothesis with a
unique data set of 270 software development contracts entered into by a leading
international bank. The analysis conﬁrms the existence of multiple hybrid con-
tracts that mitigate both price escalation and speciﬁcation volatility. It also shows
that contracting costs and beneﬁts explain more variance in contract choice when
these hybrids are included, uncovering the detailed mechanisms used to curb
opportunism when the vendor is less familiar to the client.
Keywords: incomplete contracting; ex post adaptations; hybrid contracts; soft-
ware development
JEL Classiﬁcation: D23; L14; L24; L86
I. Introduction
It is accepted that more complete contracts mitigate ex post
opportunism, but at the cost of additional ex ante contract-
ing cost (Williamson, 1985). Empirical studies generally
show that the balance between contracting costs and ben-
eﬁts is accommodated within the ﬁxed price (FP) and time
and materials (T&M) dichotomy (Bajari and Tadelis,
2001; Corts and Singh, 2004). However, Kalnins and
Mayer (2004) argue that in addition to FP and T&M,
hybrid contracts are used to balance incentives for cost
efﬁciency and quality. Speciﬁcally, T&M contracts with a
price cap are used when uncertainty is at an intermediate
level and ex post measurement costs are moderate. Such
hybrid contracts are efﬁcient because of the weaker incen-
tives for the supplier to under-provide quality and because
the relationship between the buyer and supplier has not yet
developed.
*Corresponding author. E-mail: ﬁnkl@bgu.ac.il
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The current study builds on this argument and reports
an additional type of contract that caps speciﬁcation
change to achieve a balance between contracting costs
and beneﬁts in a context where speciﬁcation changes are
common and their cost is signiﬁcant. The context is devel-
opment services for custom software (Banerjee and Duﬂo,
2000; Ethiraj et al., 2005), where standard FP contracts
provide a mechanism for speciﬁcation change. We show
that capped FP contracts that allow no speciﬁcation
changes are used when uncertainty is very low and the
relationship between the buyer and supplier has yet to be
established.
The article thus builds on recent empirical studies of
adaptation costs (e.g. Bajari et al., 2009; Guccio et al.,
2012) and their inﬂuence on contract choice (Bajari and
Tadelis, 2001). We reason that clients protect themselves
from supplier opportunism related to adaptation costs
when speciﬁcation changes are common. Speciﬁcally,
we report that the standard FP contract for software devel-
opment services includes an implicit contract to renegoti-
ate for speciﬁcation change at a reasonable mark up over
the supplier’s costs (Corts, 2012). We argue that this
implicit contract is removed when the likelihood of oppor-
tunism is high.
The current study is also closely related to the analysis
by Crocker and Reynolds (1993) of a contract typology for
jet engine procurement. We present the two FP and two
T&M contract types as a typology that balances contract-
ing costs and beneﬁts. We also report a mixed contract
type that includes system components with highly com-
plete speciﬁcations that are priced on an FP basis and
system components with less stringent speciﬁcations that
are priced on a T&M basis. Although the typology of
Crocker and Reynolds (1993) is concerned with the pri-
cing of a fully speciﬁed product, and therefore that typol-
ogy either allows or disallows ex post price changes, our
analysis includes contract types that either allow or dis-
allow both price and speciﬁcation changes.
The ﬁrst goal of this article was to describe the observed
typology of software development contracts in our
research site, a leading international bank. Software devel-
opment is of special interest because it is common to leave
the speciﬁcation of system functionality incomplete, in
particular when contracting on a T&M basis (Banerjee
and Duﬂo, 2000; Gopal et al., 2003; Ethiraj et al., 2005).
In addition, uncertainty is exceptionally high in software
development projects. Recent industry research reports
that 24% of projects are considered failures and 44% are
considered challenged in terms of time, cost or function-
ality (Standish Group, 2009). This work extends recent
analysis of non-standard contracts in this context that
include performance-based and proﬁt-sharing contracts
(Dey et al., 2010). Interestingly, our evidence goes beyond
earlier data reported in the literature, showing that
software development contracts are either FP or T&M, at
least for Indian vendors (Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2000).
However, the main goal of this article was to provide a
theoretical rationale for the observed contract typology.
We rely on the malleability of software and the fact that
about two-thirds of projects either fail or are signiﬁcantly
challenged to assert that ex post adaptations are central to
software development. We then argue that the capping of
speciﬁcation change in FP contracts is required under
certain circumstances, similar to the practice of capping
the price of T&M contracts (Kalnins and Mayer, 2004).
Finally, we offer contractual completeness as the main
analytical perspective (Grossman and Hart, 1986;
Crocker and Reynolds, 1993). We thus posit that the
costs and beneﬁts of contracting depend on both project
uncertainty and the likelihood of ex post opportunism on
the part of the vendor. This hypothesis is then tested on a
portfolio of 270 software development contracts for a
leading international bank.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. We
present a brief overview of software development out-
sourcing in Section II. We present the main theoretical
considerations, including the description of the observed
typology and the formulation of a model-based hypoth-
esis, in Section III. In Section IV, we describe the research
site and data set. We present the empirical analysis in
Section V and discuss the ﬁndings and their implications
in Section VI.
II. Software Development Outsourcing
Software development outsourcing involves the develop-
ment of custom-made software by external vendors. The
National Academy of Engineering (2008) estimated that
2003 global spending on application development was
184 billion US dollars. In outsourcing, software develop-
ment activities are managed by the vendor and performed
outside the client’s premises. This deﬁnition differentiates
software development outsourcing from other forms of
software-related outsourcing; contracting for consulting
services is typical of projects managed by the client, and
contracting for licencing of off-the-shelf software
packages usually does not involve signiﬁcant software
development.
The Standish Group annually publishes the CHAOS
report that provides an integrative assessment of success
rates in software development projects. The 2009 report
showed that 32% of software development projects are
considered successful, 44% are considered challenged in
terms of time, cost or scope and 24% are considered failed
before completion (Standish Group, 2009). Project failure
rates do not decrease as the software engineering
4498 L. Fink et al.
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discipline matures, and the 2009 report showed the highest
rate of failure in the last decade.
These failure rates reﬂect the high level of uncertainty in
software development, where frequent changes in busi-
ness and technological environments require frequent
changes in system speciﬁcation. Therefore, a major chal-
lenge in software development outsourcing is bridging the
gap between the frequent need to modify the functionality
and design of the system under development and the
binding nature of the contract governing the relationship
between the parties (Sia et al., 2008).
The contracts governing software development have
generally been classiﬁed as either FP or T&M (Whang,
1992; Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2000; Gopal et al., 2003;
Lichtenstein, 2004). With FP contracts, the price for com-
pleting the project is predetermined. Conversely, T&M
contracts do not specify a price, but rather reimburse the
vendor for its costs plus a predetermined proﬁt. The com-
mon practice in the industry is to have very detailed system
speciﬁcations only for FP contracts and to keep speciﬁca-
tions loosely deﬁned for T&M contracts (Dey et al., 2010).
The detailed speciﬁcations are needed in FP contracts to
allow agreement on the content of work and the price,
whereas the loose speciﬁcations in T&M contracts serve
the purpose of leaving functionality issues to be resolved
during the development process. While the themes of the
literature on software development contracting are quite
diverse, including risk sharing, project proﬁtability, the
role of trust and company reputation and capabilities, it is
universally recognized that contract choice is the key man-
agerial decision.
III. Theoretical Considerations
Procurement contracting
Economic theory models procurement as a problem of ex
ante asymmetric information, uncertainty that persists
beyond the contracting date and results in hold-up, and
unobservable effort that results in moral hazard
(Williamson, 1975; Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Bolton and
Dewatripont, 2005). Theory predicts that menus of con-
tracts are offered by buyers to reduce private information
and potential hold-up and to create incentives to exert
effort.
However, most relevant to the current study is research
that focuses on ex post uncertainty and adaptations. Bajari
and Tadelis (2001) observe that most contracts are variants
of simple FP and T&M contracts, since the buyer and
seller have little ex ante private information but they
share uncertainty about many important ex post design
changes. They argue that an FP contract is used because
it does not require the measurement of production costs
that a cost-sharing contract requires. Similarly, T&M con-
tracts are used because they reduce the need to verify
quality; even partial incentives to reduce costs require
expensive quality veriﬁcation mechanisms.
The persistence of uncertainty beyond the contracting
date is also argued to result in the use of hybrid contracts,
which combine the features of FP and T&M contracts to
balance incentives for cost efﬁciency and quality (Kalnins
and Mayer, 2004). Capping the price of T&M contracts
maintains their renegotiation beneﬁts. As long as the price
cap is not exceeded, the supplier is guaranteed a proﬁt and
changes are incorporated without renegotiation. This type
of hybrid contract also maintains some of the incentives of
FP contracts, because the supplier has an incentive to
contain costs when it approaches the price cap.
Therefore, capped T&M contracts are likely to be used
at intermediate levels of ex ante cost uncertainty.
Similarly, at intermediate levels of ex post measurement
costs, capped T&M contracts are more attractive than FP
contracts because of the weaker incentive for the supplier
to reduce quality. Finally, capped T&M contracts may be
used when the relationship between the parties has not yet
developed and the beneﬁts of repeated interaction have yet
to be realized.
Finally, a major inﬂuence on the present study is the
empirical investigation of contractual completeness in the
US Air Force engine procurement by Crocker and
Reynolds (1993). They reason that had contracting been
costless, it would have been possible to write sufﬁciently
complete contracts to circumscribe all ex post opportu-
nism. However, the costs of identifying contingencies,
devising responses and reaching agreements are consider-
able. Thus, the parties balance the costs of ex post oppor-
tunism against the costs of crafting more complete
contracts ex ante. The result is a contract typology,
which represents a continuum of balance points of price
completeness and includes price adjustments, price ceil-
ings and successive negotiations on price targets.
Speciﬁcally, the costs of a more complete contract are
related to environmental uncertainty, because uncertainty
leads to more contingencies and responses. The beneﬁts to
the client of completeness are related to the likelihood of
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the seller.
The observed contract typology
The current article stems from a careful analysis of a
contract portfolio of one of the largest banks in the
world, which contracts out system development through
about 100 vendors. Custom systems are tailored to speciﬁc
client needs, which, at least in banking, are highly volatile
and require frequent ex post adaptations. In this context,
speciﬁcation volatility is a major concern in addition to
cost uncertainty and quality measurement difﬁculty
(Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). While price escalation is a
Ex post adaptations and hybrid contracts in software development services 4499
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major hazard in T&M contracts, speciﬁcation volatility is
a major hazard in FP contracts. Therefore, placing a cap on
speciﬁcation change in FP contracts can serve as a
mechanism of reducing renegotiation costs, in addition
to the mechanism created by placing a price cap on T&M
contracts. When speciﬁcation volatility is very low, placing
a cap on speciﬁcation change can curb renegotiation oppor-
tunities and limit ex post adaptations in FP contracts. When
speciﬁcation volatility is somewhat higher, ex post adapta-
tions may be allowed by using the standard FP contract that
includes a change mechanism. Finally, T&M contracts are
likely to be used when speciﬁcation volatility is high and
frequent ex post adaptations are expected.
Our analysis of this contract portfolio shows that about
one-third of the contracts are neither FP nor T&M but
signiﬁcant variations of these archetypes. In addition to
the introduction of mixed contracts, FP contracts are
divided into those that allow changes and those that dis-
allow them, and T&M contracts are divided into those that
include a binding price cap and those that do not. Two of
the archetypes are widely used in the industry, FP without
a cap on speciﬁcation change and T&M without a cap on
price, so we label them just as FP and T&M to get the
following typology:
● Firm FP (speciﬁcation changes are not allowed)
● FP (with an explicit procedure for speciﬁcation
changes)
● Mixed (both FP and T&M components)
● Not-to-exceed T&M (a price cap that may not be
exceeded is agreed ex ante)
● T&M (without a price cap)
Table 1 presents the issues negotiated ex ante and ex post
for each of the ﬁve archetypes. In contrast to many pro-
curement contracts (e.g. engine procurement), where the
speciﬁcation is given and the level of completeness is
related only to production price, the level of completeness
in software development is related to both speciﬁcation
and price. The following paragraphs describe each of the
archetypes in the new typology and explain their relative
completeness.
Firm FP. In ﬁrm FP contracts, price and speciﬁcations
are fully predetermined ex ante, and contracts do not
include a mechanism to accommodate change in the
speciﬁcations. Managers at the bank explain that the
exclusion of a change mechanism is infrequent because
it requires the highest level of design completeness. The
contracting consequences of disallowing change are
important, because ex post negotiation is costly and cre-
ates a contractual hazard (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001;
Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). The costs and risks of
renegotiation are of special importance because of the
difﬁculty to verify the quality and maintainability of the
system. Under this archetype, a high level of trust in the
vendor is not warranted (Mayer et al., 1995), and bidding
becomes highly competitive (Iacovou and Nakatsu,
2008).
FP. Although price and speciﬁcations are fully prede-
termined ex ante, the FP contract includes a clause with an
explicit change management procedure that allows chan-
ging both speciﬁcations and price. Managers in the indus-
try explain that it is standard practice to include a change
provision in FP contracts, as is indeed reﬂected in the
research literature (Saunders et al., 1997; Sia et al.,
2008; Chen and Bharadwaj, 2009). Such clauses can be
viewed as safeguards (Williamson, 1985), speciﬁcally as
contingency planning used to protect a vulnerable party
(Argyres et al., 2007). Furthermore, these clauses expli-
citly open the possibility of an augmented FP contract that
allows the vendor to perform modiﬁcations on a T&M
basis (Corts, 2012).
Mixed. The mixed archetype covers contracts that
include both FP and T&M work packages. Mixed soft-
ware development contracts have been reported by Dey
et al. (2010). Banerjee and Duﬂo (2000) explain that in
these contracts the work involved in writing the full func-
tional speciﬁcation and technological design tends to be
performed on a T&M basis and the rest of the work,
including programming and testing, tends to be done on
Table 1. Contractual archetypes of software development outsourcing
Speciﬁcation Price
Archetype Negotiated ex ante Negotiated ex post Negotiated ex ante Negotiated ex post
Firm FP Full speciﬁcation Price
FP Full speciﬁcation Changes to the speciﬁcation Price Price of changes
Mixed Full speciﬁcation
(FP components)
Changes to the speciﬁcation
(FP components)
Price (FP components) Price of changes
(FP components)
Rough speciﬁcation
(T&M components)
Detailed implementation
(T&M components)
Daily rates (T&M components)
Not-to-exceed T&M Rough speciﬁcation Detailed implementation Price cap, daily rates
T&M Rough speciﬁcation Detailed implementation Daily rates
4500 L. Fink et al.
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an FP basis. An interesting consequence of the mixed
archetype is that it leads to simple risk sharing, as T&M
cost risk is borne by the client, while FP cost risk is on the
vendor (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001).
Not-to-exceed T&M. In the not-to-exceed T&M con-
tract, the client reimburses the vendor for its expenses up
to a price cap that is agreed ex ante. This archetype is
identical to the hybrid contract described by Kalnins and
Mayer (2004). The price cap indicates that the client has
speciﬁed the main features of the software and has esti-
mated its development costs, as in FP contracts, but will
control costs and pay, as in T&M contracts, up to the cap.
The not-to-exceed T&M archetype is considered less
complete than the mixed archetype, because the former
mostly relies on a T&M mechanism, with loose system
speciﬁcations, whereas the latter typically includes a sub-
stantial FP part, with detailed system speciﬁcations.
T&M. This archetype represents the standard T&M
contract, in which the speciﬁcation for the system is not
fully detailed and the price for project completion is not
constrained. The primary beneﬁt of this archetype, relative
to an FP contract, is the reduced negotiation cost (Bajari
and Tadelis, 2001) that comes at the expense of introdu-
cing a moral hazard problem (Corts and Singh, 2004). As
requirements change, the vendor is more likely to accept
changes requested by the client without the need for rene-
gotiation (Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). In contrast to the
not-to-exceed T&M archetype, the standard T&M arche-
type poses a signiﬁcant risk of cost escalation. Thus,
familiar, trustworthy vendors are more likely to be granted
such contracts.
Contract type selection
It is assumed that the typology described above is applied
efﬁciently, that is the parties balance the costs of selecting
a more complete contractual archetype with the beneﬁts
that completeness provides (Crocker and Reynolds,
1993). Costs are related to uncertainty, because high
uncertainty requires the identiﬁcation of more contingen-
cies and responses. Beneﬁts are related to the likelihood of
opportunism by the vendor; when such likelihood is small,
there is no need for complete contracts.
In our context, the costs are those of writing a detailed
speciﬁcation of the system and estimating the costs of its
development. These costs are related to project uncer-
tainty (w), because higher uncertainty requires more nego-
tiation about system features and their implementation, as
well as more contingency clauses; thus, contracts for
uncertain projects are more costly to craft.
The beneﬁts of a complete contract are the ability to
prevent ex post opportunism of the vendor and ex post
renegotiation costs. Opportunism in our context includes
reducing effort on the part of the vendor and developing
lower-quality software, inﬂating T&M costs (Dey et al.,
2010) and increasing costs when changes are requested by
either client or vendor. The likelihood of opportunism (L)
is inﬂuenced by both client and vendor characteristics; in
particular, we assume that some vendors engage in oppor-
tunistic behaviour and others do not.
We use a panel data set of contracts, estimating the
relationship between contractual completeness and project
and vendor characteristics:
Yij ¼ f wij; Lij
 þ εij (1)
where Yij is the completeness measure of the archetype
chosen for contract i of vendor j, wij represents expecta-
tions of project uncertainty and Lij is the expected like-
lihood of opportunism by vendor j before contract i is
signed. The relationship (Equation 1) is modelled as a
linear relationship as follows:
Yij ¼ aþ bwij þ cLij þ εij (2)
This model suggests that project uncertainty and likeli-
hood of opportunism are linearly related to contractual
completeness (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993).
Speciﬁcally, the incomplete contracting perspective and
the reasoning presented above lead to the hypothesis that
project uncertainty is negatively related to contractual
completeness and that the likelihood of opportunism is
positively related to contractual completeness. We expect
to ﬁnd more complete contracts used for projects with
lower uncertainty (lower cost of drafting complete con-
tracts) and higher likelihood of opportunism (higher ben-
eﬁt of drafting complete contracts).
IV. Data
The research setting for this study is the ﬁnancial services
industry, which is considered to be the largest user of IT in
the industrial sectors (Zhu et al., 2004) and which tends to
have the highest IT investment risk (Dewan et al., 2007).
We analyse the contract portfolio of a leading international
bank, headquartered in Europe. It provides retail and com-
mercial banking, wealthmanagement and investment bank-
ing in dozens of countries and has tens of thousands of
employees. The bank’s IT department employs about 3000
permanent employees and 2000 contractors. The bank con-
tracts out system development through about 100 local and
international vendors. Its methods of managing software
development contracts are typical of other large companies.
The bank aims at using its standard software development
contracts wherever possible. The standard contract is simi-
lar to contract forms described in the literature (e.g.
Pearson, 1984; Kutten, 1988). This contract is about 10
Ex post adaptations and hybrid contracts in software development services 4501
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pages in length, excluding appendices for scope and sche-
dule. The bank’s contracting guidelines permit changes to
the standard contract within deﬁned limits.
Consistent with previous research, the unit of analysis
in this study is the contract (e.g. Gulati, 1995; Gopal et al.,
2003; Ethiraj et al., 2005). We collected detailed quanti-
tative data from the bank’s contract repository. Each
record in the repository represented a single contract and
included the contract number, start and end dates, contract
price, vendor name and an electronic scan of the contract.
We were given access to 270 software development con-
tracts signed between January 2000 and April 2003.
Table 2 presents data on the contractual archetypes.
Project uncertainty is evaluated by three items gleaned
from contract text. Contract price (as a proxy for size) has
been identiﬁed as a factor contributing to software devel-
opment uncertainty (Barki et al., 1993). The relation
between project size and uncertainty has been acknowl-
edged by much of the literature on software development.
Large projects are more likely to fail because of the difﬁ-
culty to coordinate multiple tasks and many developers
(Wallace et al., 2004). Price is the binding price in ﬁrm FP
and FP contracts, the price cap in not-to-exceed T&M
contracts, the cost estimation in T&M contracts or the
sum of FP and T&M prices in mixed contracts. In addi-
tion, contract Duration is used as a proxy for business and
technology volatility; longer projects require more con-
tingency planning and thus more costly contracts, similar
to the associations between contract time-horizon, volati-
lity and contracting cost in engine procurement (Crocker
and Reynolds, 1993). The ﬁnal measure of uncertainty
uses the number of Intermediate Deliverables, as deﬁned
in the contract text. Intermediate deliverables tied to
payments, also known as milestones (Sommerville,
2000), reﬂect uncertainty because when many such deli-
verables are deﬁned, the development course is deﬁned in
minute detail and ex ante uncertainty is low. It should be
noted that our conversations with managers at the bank
showed that contract details, including the timely provi-
sion of deliverables, their acceptance and the transfer of
payments, are typically followed strictly during contract
execution, in accordance with the highly controlled man-
agement style of the bank.
The likelihood of opportunism is measured in terms of
business familiarity (Gulati, 1995; Ryall and Sampson,
2009) using two measures (Gefen et al., 2008). The ﬁrst
measure is Previous Contracts, deﬁned as the accumu-
lated price of previous contracts signed with the same
vendor after January 2000 and up to the speciﬁc contract.
The logic underlying this measure is that vendors who
have a long history of work for the bank are unlikely to be
opportunistic, at least because the bank continues to be a
major client for IT services. Therefore, high values in this
measure represent high business familiarity and thus low
likelihood of opportunism. The second measure is the
vendor Locality, which may be either international (desig-
nated by 1) or local (2). The logic underlying this measure
is that local vendors are less likely to behave opportunis-
tically with this large local client.
All the measures described above are objective and
involve no subjective judgment. Descriptive statistics are
given in Table 3, the correlation matrix is given in Table 4
and cross-tabulation of the measures with contractual
completeness is given in Table 5.
The cross-tabulation in Table 5 suggests that project
uncertainty is negatively associated with contractual
Table 2. Archetype data (N = 270)
Archetype Number of contracts Percentage Average price ($K) Average duration (days) Example
Firm FP 42 16% 169.64 129.45 Electronic archive
FP 139 51% 284.01 182.70 SWIFT
Mixed 32 12% 632.00 230.45 Credit process
Not-to-exceed T&M 14 5% 321.36 242.46 Global accounting
T&M 43 16% 323.61 222.49 ATM
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Project uncertainty
Price ($K) 2 3490 315.65 474.77
Duration (days) 3 880 189.60 143.30
Intermediate deliverables 0 13 2.09 2.31
Likelihood of opportunism
Previous contracts ($K) 0 21 037 4426 5883
Locality (1 = international, 2 = local) 1 2 1.79 0.41
4502 L. Fink et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
&F
 In
ter
na
l U
se
rs]
, [
Ca
ro
l A
lex
an
de
r] 
at 
10
:25
 24
 Ju
ne
 20
13
 
completeness. Speciﬁcally, larger (higher priced) and
longer projects are characterized by higher uncertainty
and thus use less complete contract types (i.e. mixed or
T&M contracts). Similarly, higher uncertainty, as reﬂected
by a lower number of intermediate deliverables, is asso-
ciated with T&M contracts.
The effect of likelihood of opportunism on contractual
completeness is not as clear when observing the full range
of archetypes. With the exception of ﬁrm FP contracts,
locality is similar on average for all archetypes and the
effect of previous contracts with the bank is not obvious.
These effects are analysed more carefully in the next
section.
However, Table 5 is much clearer with respect to the
differences between the two FP archetypes and between
the two T&M archetypes. On average, vendors with
ﬁrm FP contracts have about 10 times less experience
with the bank than vendors with standard FP contracts.
Similarly, vendors with not-to-exceed T&M contracts
have about half the experience with the bank of vendors
with open, standard T&M contracts. Therefore, the like-
lihood of opportunism is restricted by using capped
contracts in both FP and T&M regimes. Our data set
thus shows that capped variations of FP and T&M
contracts are used as insurance against unfamiliar ven-
dors, a mechanism predicted but not conﬁrmed by
Kalnins and Mayer (2004).
V. Empirical Analysis
We test the hypothesis that contractual completeness is
negatively affected by project uncertainty and positively
affected by the likelihood of opportunism using OLS and
ordered probit models, which include controls for vendor
and contract characteristics. The estimates of Equation 2
using OLS regressions are presented in Table 6. Column 1
includes the ﬁve measures of project uncertainty and like-
lihood of opportunism, and columns 2 and 3 add variables
intended to control for potential effects of vendor and
contract characteristics on contractual completeness.
Speciﬁcally, column 2 adds the variables of vendor size
and vendor experience, where the former represents the
total number of vendor employees and the latter represents
the number of years since the vendor was founded. These
two vendor characteristics control for the possibility that
less complete contracts are used for larger and more
experienced vendors. Column 3 adds the variables of
contract length and attached documents, where the former
represents the number of contract pages and the latter
represents the number of attached documents, such as
system speciﬁcations and design, referred to in the actual
contract text. These two contract characteristics control for
the possibility that contract choice is affected by the
volume or detail of the actual contract and attached
documents.
Table 4. Correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Price (log) 1
2. Duration (log) 0.533*** 1
3. Intermediate deliverables 0.217*** 0.136* 1
4. Previous contracts (log) 0.098 0.054 −0.066 1
5. Locality 0.376*** 0.267*** 0.060 0.386*** 1
6. Contractual completeness −0.325*** −0.231*** 0.257*** −0.204*** −0.262*** 1
Note: *p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001; two-tailed p-values are reported.
Table 5. Cross-tabulation of contractual completeness with project uncertainty and likelihood of opportunism
Contractual completeness Project uncertainty Likelihood of opportunism
Archetype Completeness Price ($K) Duration (days) Intermediate deliverables
Previous
contracts ($K)
Locality
(1 = int.,
2 = local)
High completeness Low uncertainty High likelihood
Firm FP 5 169.64 129.45 1.95 406.02 1.33
FP 4 284.01 182.70 2.58 4594.00 1.86
Mixed 3 632.00 230.45 2.75 5754.38 1.94
Not-to-exceed T&M 2 321.36 242.46 0.93 3690.79 1.93
T&M 1 323.61 222.49 0.56 7062.47 1.86
Low completeness High uncertainty Low likelihood
Ex post adaptations and hybrid contracts in software development services 4503
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The signs of the coefﬁcients estimated in Table 6 are
consistent with our hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, the coefﬁ-
cients of price and duration are negative (higher price
and longer duration, thus higher uncertainty, resulting in
lower completeness), while the coefﬁcient of intermediate
deliverables is positive (more intermediate deliverables,
lower uncertainty and higher completeness). As expected,
the coefﬁcients of previous contracts and locality are
negative (higher business familiarity, lower likelihood of
opportunism and lower completeness). Only three of the
coefﬁcients for the baseline model in column 1, those for
price, intermediate deliverables and previous contracts,
are statistically signiﬁcant (at the 0.05 level). However,
the inclusion of vendor and contract characteristics as
additional explanatory variables in columns 2 and 3 results
in statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for all ﬁve measures
of project uncertainty and likelihood of opportunism (the
coefﬁcient of duration is signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level). The
hypothesized effects thus become stronger after control-
ling for the effects of vendor and contract characteristics.
A concern with the OLS regressions is that they treat
contractual completeness as a continuous variable. This con-
cern is addressed by using ordered probitmodels, as summar-
ized in Table 7. We estimate nine ordered probit
speciﬁcations: three using our ﬁve-archetype contractual
completeness typology, three using a three-archetype typol-
ogy (FP, mixed and T&M) and three using a two-archetype
typology (FP andmixed/T&M). The two-archetype typology
is created by combining the mixed archetype with the T&M
archetypes because in all three archetypes, the overall price is
not determined ex ante, whereas in the twoFP archetypes, the
price is ﬁxed ex ante. The three speciﬁcations for each
typology are similar to those in Table 6: columns 1, 4 and 7
include the ﬁve measures of project uncertainty and likeli-
hood of opportunism, columns 2, 5 and 8 add the two vendor
characteristics and columns 3, 6 and 9 add the two contract
characteristics.
The ordered probit results presented in columns 1–3 of
Table 7 are generally consistent with the OLS results, with
the exception that the coefﬁcient of locality is statistically
signiﬁcant in the baseline ordered probit model (column 1).
Similar to the OLS results, all ﬁve measures of project uncer-
tainty and likelihood of opportunism become statistically sig-
niﬁcant once vendor and contract characteristics are included
as additional explanatory variables (columns 2 and 3). The
ordered probit models for the three-archetype typology (col-
umns 4–6) and the two-archetype typology (columns 7–9) are
less predictive of contract choice thanourﬁve-archetype typol-
ogy. Beyond lower χ2 and R2 values, the coefﬁcients of pre-
vious contracts and locality are weaker and generally not
statistically signiﬁcant for the narrower typologies. This ﬁnd-
ing suggests that the likelihood of opportunism explains more
variance in our broader contractual completeness typology
than in narrower contract typologies. Interestingly, across all
OLS and ordered probit models estimated, the coefﬁcients of
vendor size are negative and statistically signiﬁcant, implying
that more complete contracts are used with smaller vendors.
Endogeneity analysis
The results of our analysis may be biased because of simulta-
neity and endogenous matching (Ackerberg and Botticini,
2002; Corts and Singh, 2004). In our context, simultaneity
means that decisions relating to system speciﬁcation, vendor
selection and contract choice may be taken simultaneously.
Table 6. OLS results
Contractual completeness
(1) (2) (3)
Project uncertainty Price (log) −0.305*** (−4.403) −0.249*** (−3.733) −0.255*** (−3.499)
Duration (log) −0.080 (−1.235) −0.109+ (−1.715) −0.110+ (−1.722)
Intermediate deliverables 0.321*** (5.707) 0.319*** (5.945) 0.314*** (5.847)
Likelihood of opportunism Previous contracts (log) −0.150* (−2.515) −0.143* (−2.258) −0.159* (−2.503)
Locality (1 = int., 2 = local) −0.089 (−1.374) −0.188** (−2.917) −0.180** (−2.784)
Vendor characteristics Vendor size −0.282*** (−3.742) −0.281*** (−3.731)
Vendor experience −0.023 (−0.292) −0.022 (−0.283)
Contract characteristics Contract length −0.064 (−1.043)
Attached documents 0.104+ (1.813)
F 17.656*** 18.235*** 14.692***
Degrees of freedom 5 7 9
R2 0.265 0.344 0.354
Adjusted R2 0.250 0.326 0.330
Notes: Estimated standardized coefﬁcients for OLS models are shown with t values in parentheses. Columns (1)–(3) use as dependent
variable our ﬁve-archetype contractual completeness typology.
+p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; two-tailed p-values are reported.
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According to industry experts we interviewed, a client may
have preliminary contract preferences for a speciﬁc project.
However, the ﬁnal choice of contract is made only after the
requirements are deﬁned, the vendor is selected and speciﬁ-
cation and price are negotiated. Endogenous matching
(Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002) may occur because of unob-
served characteristics of the project that create associations
among speciﬁc projects, vendors and contracts. Among the
variables hypothesized in this study to affect contractual
completeness, price is the most susceptible to the problems
of simultaneity and endogenous matching. After the contract
type has been determined, the contracting parties are not
likely to make adjustments to system speciﬁcation or vendor
selection. The variablemost susceptible to adjustments at this
stage is price, because adjustments to duration or intermediate
deliverables require changes in project planning, and the
vendor is not likely to be replaced at this stage. Moreover,
price is the variable most likely to be matched with contrac-
tual completeness as a consequence of unobserved technolo-
gical characteristics. For example, a new and expensive
technology may create an incentive for the client to use a
T&M contract for a high-priced project.
To address these problems, we use a perceived measure
of System Interconnectedness, which relates to the con-
nectedness of the new system with other internal systems
of the bank, as an instrumental variable. During data
collection, each contract in the portfolio was reviewed
and ranked on a 5-point scale by one of the authors (who
had extensive experience with software development pro-
jects in both client and vendor ﬁrms). The degree of
interconnectedness was determined by mapping informa-
tion in the contracts to clear-cut criteria, as detailed in
Table 8. We assume that interconnectedness is exogenous
because the technical speciﬁcations of the connections
with other bank systems are a standard part of the bank’s
IT infrastructure, which is relatively stable. The intercon-
nectedness of the system under development is central to
its speciﬁcation, and it rarely changes during negotiation
or development. It is, therefore, unlikely that interconnect-
edness is affected by contract choice. We further assume
that interconnectedness is informative because it corre-
lates with price – a higher degree of interconnectedness
requires more development effort. According to inter-
views with industry experts, the careful connection of a
new system to existing systems consumes signiﬁcant
development resources because of the need to analyse all
possible interactions between systems, to specify the
required inputs and outputs, to program these speciﬁca-
tions and to test them in both synthetic and operational
environments. All this work is reﬂected in the price of a
new system in large organizations.
Consequently, interconnectedness is used as an instru-
mental variable in testing the endogeneity of price with a
two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis. The results of this
analysis, presented in Table 9, validate our earlier ﬁndings
by showing only small differences in the magnitude of
coefﬁcients for the baseline model. In particular, the pre-
dicted price using the instrumental variable maintains the
highly signiﬁcant effect on contractual completeness. We
use the Wu–Hausman speciﬁcation test for endogeneity to
examine the signiﬁcance of the predicted values of price
when included as an additional explanatory variable in the
full regression. This test shows that the predicted price has
no signiﬁcant effect in this case (t = −1.24, p = 0.216),
indicating that the null hypothesis that price should be
treated as an exogenous variable cannot be rejected.
Therefore, endogeneity does not appear to be a serious
concern in interpreting our results. Although our instru-
mentation approach is limited, it goes beyond most of the
Table 9. 2SLS results
Contractual
completeness
2SLS model
Project uncertainty Price (log) ‒0.464** (‒2.604)
Duration (log) ‒0.050 (‒0.453)
Intermediate
deliverables
0.385*** (6.416)
Likelihood of
opportunism
Previous contracts
(log)
‒0.139* (‒2.281)
Locality
(1 = int.,
2 = local)
‒0.014 (‒0.190)
F 15.914***
Degrees of freedom 5
R2 0.255
Adjusted R2 0.239
Notes: The 2SLS model uses the instrumental variable of system
interconnectedness to test the endogeneity of price. Estimated
standardized coefﬁcients are shown with t values in parentheses.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; two-tailed p-values are
reported.
Table 8. Deﬁnition of the system interconnectedness instrumental variable
Interconnectedness 1 2 3 4 5
Interfaces/modules Single Single Single Multiple Multiple
Interface deﬁnitions None None Well-deﬁned Well-deﬁned Ill-deﬁned
Relation to other systems Standalone Standalone Connected Connected Connected
Speciﬁcation Simple Elaborated Simple Elaborated Elaborated
4506 L. Fink et al.
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extant literature, which typically does not address these
problems (Corts and Singh, 2004).
VI. Discussion
The main goal of this article was to provide a theore-
tical rationale for the combinations of FP and T&M
mechanisms that create the observed contract typology.
Our analysis of a large portfolio of software develop-
ment contracts of a leading international bank indeed
shows that archetypes are chosen by balancing the costs
and beneﬁts of crafting more complete contracts
(Crocker and Reynolds, 1993). High speciﬁcation vola-
tility projects, for which complete contracts would be
costly to draft, are likely to be based on the less
complete archetypes. Similarly, these incomplete con-
tracts are likely to be granted to familiar vendors for
whom the likelihood of behaving opportunistically is
low. The differences among archetypes in uncertainty
and likelihood of opportunism are signiﬁcant along the
full typology and not only between the standard FP and
T&M archetypes.
An additional goal of the article was to bring to light a
nuanced typology of contracts for software development.
Indeed, one-third of the contracts we reviewed differ sig-
niﬁcantly from the FP and T&M types on which the litera-
ture focuses (Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2000; Gopal et al., 2003;
Ethiraj et al., 2005). Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm FP contracts cap
speciﬁcation volatility by allowing no change during the
development period and thus prevent costly renegotiation
(Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). Firm FP contracts are, on
average, about half the price of standard FP contracts and
are more frequently awarded to unfamiliar vendors. Not-to-
exceed T&M contracts deﬁne a price cap on the T&M
mechanism; these contracts are similar to T&M contracts
in all dimensions but one – vendors’ previous experience
with the client, which is, on average, half of the experience
of T&M vendors. These ﬁndings conﬁrm the expectation
that capped variations of FP and T&M contracts are used as
insurance against unfamiliar vendors. Finally, mixed con-
tracts, which may be seen as the simplest form of hybrid
contracts, are shown here to be a major technique of soft-
ware development contracting. Although only one-eighth
of the contracts are mixed, they constitute one quarter of the
bank’s portfolio, by price.
The limitations of the article lie in the reliance on a
single organization, particularly since the large size and
long experience of the bank are likely to inﬂuence its
contracting practices. Although learning from such a client
is laudable, our results should be generalized to other
organizations with caution. Similarly, we had to rely on
the contracts themselves to measure project uncertainty
and likelihood of opportunism. While these measures are
objective and not subject to bias, our analysis is limited by
the fact that we had no access to the project managers and
their considerations for selecting contact types.
The main implication of the current study for research is
the need to identify additional mechanisms that address ex
post adaptations and, more generally, other combinations
or hybrids of FP and T&M mechanisms that are used in
practice. The recent procurement literature describes a
range of contract typologies: the single-archetype typol-
ogy of unit price auctions for highway improvements
(Bajari et al., 2006), the prevalent two-archetype typology
of FP and T&M typical of construction projects (Bajari
and Tadelis, 2001; Bajari et al., 2009), the three-archetype
typology for IT services (Kalnins and Mayer, 2004) and
the ﬁve-archetype typology for jet engine procurement
(Crocker and Reynolds, 1993). The present study extends
this line of research by describing a novel ﬁve-archetype
typology for custom software development. Are there
other hybrids and elaborate typologies used in practice?
Practical implications are mostly relevant to the soft-
ware development industry. They include the need for
managers to consider the full gamut of FP and T&M
mechanisms to make more resources available while redu-
cing risks in software development. Speciﬁcally, using
ﬁrm FP contracts should allow clients to start working
with unfamiliar vendors on short and stable projects that
are not prone to renegotiation. Similarly, not-to-exceed
T&M contracts should allow the client to work with ven-
dors that are usually not trusted with standard T&M pro-
jects. The importance of software vendors in modern
businesses creates new challenges in the management of
technology (Applegate et al., 2009). The current article
shows that speciﬁcation volatility and ex post adaptations
are central to these challenges and that an elaborate con-
tract typology is required to balance project uncertainty
and vendor-related hazards.
Finally, the merits of different contractual mechan-
isms have recently become an issue for public debate,
as the US government has encouraged agencies to use
competitive bidding and FP contracts for Recovery
Act 2009 projects to the maximum extent possible.
However, the literature suggests that for projects in
which speciﬁcations and cost are difﬁcult to estimate,
T&M contracts may be more appropriate. This article
will hopefully inform this debate by extending the
literature on ex post adaptations, presenting additional
contractual mechanisms and analysing their various
levels of contractual completeness.
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